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Part 7
G.R. No. 189698 - ELEAZAR P. QUINTO AND GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, December 1, 2009
DISSENTING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO
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Broadrick, likewise, held that the statute did not violate the equal protection clause by singling out classified service employees for restrictions on political expression, while leaving unclassified personnel free from such. The court reasoned that the state legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment positions required these restrictions.
Accordingly, Letter Carriers and Broadrick teach us that: (i) the state has interests as employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees? expression interferes with maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions.
It is against this factual backdrop that Magill v. Lynch, a 1977 decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, gains prominence. Noteworthy, this case concerned a similar law, and was decided by the same court that decided Mancuso.
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975. Pawtucket?s ?Little Hatch Act? prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities. Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically proscribed, the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on the ground that that the provision of the city charter was unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the government?s interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of Congress, and applying a ?balancing? test to determine whether limits on political activity by public employees substantially served government interests which were ?important? enough to outweigh the employees? First Amendment rights.
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise even though the election in Magill was characterized as nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of that case, that politically active bureaucrats might use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes.
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Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, which was heavily relied upon by the ponencia, has effectively been overruled. As it is no longer good law, the ponencia?s exhortation that we should follow Mancuso ?[since] the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,]? is misplaced and unwarranted.
(To be continued)
