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Part 1
PAGODA PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 160966
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
UNIVERSAL CANNING, INC.,
Respondent.
October 11, 2005
x x x
The Court believes that there are actually two issues to be settled in this case: first, whether mandamus is the proper remedy to assail an order of voluntary inhibition; and second, whether there was a valid and just reason for the voluntary inhibition of the trial court judge.
The Court?s Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Remedy Against the Order of Voluntary Inhibition
At the outset, we note that petitioner, in an effort to cover its bases, filed the present Petition as both a petition for review under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The applicable rule is Rule 45, which clearly provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case ? regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved ? may be appealed to this Court through a petition for review. This remedy is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[7] ?It is basic that where Rule 45 is available, and in fact availed of as a remedy -- as in this case -- recourse under Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal.?[8]
The procedural infirmity notwithstanding, this Court shall deal with this Petition as one filed under Rule 45 only and shall treat the alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA as an allegation of reversible error.
Petitioner claims that respondent erred when the latter questioned the trial judge?s Order of Voluntary Inhibition ? supposedly a purely discretionary act ? through a Petition for Mandamus filed with the CA.
While, ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act, the writ shall issue in instances of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled; and when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[9] This Court has recognized that ?[a] judge?s decision to refuse to act on account of some disqualification is not conclusive, and his competency may be determined on an application for mandamus to compel him to act.?[10]
Second Issue:
Inhibition
Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
?Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
?A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.?
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.? The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.[11]
(To be continued)
